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NOTE
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. V. STATE
ENERGY RESOURCES CONSER VA TION AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION. BROADENING THE
SCOPE OF STATE AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
The authority to control nuclear energy was once within the exclusive pro-
vince of the federal government.' As states have acquired technical exper-
tise, however, Congress has authorized the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)2 to delegate selected aspects of nuclear regulation3 to the states.
Moreover, certain states have attempted to assume authority over aspects
of nuclear regulation that Congress has not authorized the NRC to delegate.'
1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), gave the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
a federal agency, exclusive ownership of nuclear reactors, § 4(c)(1), and fissionable nuclear
materials, § 5(a)(2). In addition, § 10 of the Act gave the AEC authority to control the dissemina-
tion of technical information concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear power reactors. This
effectively gave the federal government exclusive authority over all aspects of nuclear technology.
See W. BERMAN & L. HYDEMAN, THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND REGULATING NUCLEAR
FACILITIES 65 (1961).
2. From 1946 until 1974, the AEC was the federal agency responsible for promoting, licens-
ing, and regulating nuclear energy. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438,
88 Stat. 1233 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § A 5801-5891 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), abolished the
AEC, 42 U.S.C. § 5814(a), and created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), id. § 5841,
and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), id. § 5811. The Act transfer-
red the AEC's promotional responsibilities to the ERDA, id. § 5814, and its regulatory and
licensing responsibilities to the NRC, id. § 5841(f).
3. The 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688
(1959) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), authorized the AEC
to enter into agreements with the states. These agreements provided for the AEC to discon-
tinue regulation of specified materials, such as byproduct materials, and authorized the states
to regulate those materials. In addition, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-95, § 122, 91 Stat. 720 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (Supp. IV 1980)),
authorized the states to regulate radioactive air pollutants from nuclear plants. Also, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980, § 108(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133-2134
(Supp. V 1981), authorized the states to impose land use and siting requirements for nuclear
plants. The legislative history of the 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act indicates
that states were to be given more authority over nuclear energy as their technical qualifications
increased. See S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2872, 2879.
4. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 Ill. App. 3d 800,
284 N.E.2d 342 (3rd Dist. 1972) (state statute authorizing regulation of radiation from nuclear
plants preempted by federal law); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237
N.W.2d 266 (1975) (state courts preempted by federal law from considering plaintiff's allega-
tion regarding the workability of a nuclear reactor's emergency core cooling system).
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The growing participation of states in the regulation of nuclear energy, com-
bined with the rapid growth of the nuclear energy industry,' has complicated
the law surrounding nuclear energy regulation.' Despite this increasing com-
plexity, prior to last term, the United States Supreme Court had never directly
addressed the extent to which federal law preempts state attempts to regulate
nuclear energy.'
Recently, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Con-
servation and Development Commission,' the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the division of nuclear regulatory power between federal and state
government. The Pacific Gas Court upheld a California statute that pro-
hibits construction of new nuclear power plants until the federal govern-
ment develops and approves a safe method of nuclear waste disposal.
Analysis of the Pacific Gas decision reveals that the Court reaffirmed the
federal government's exclusive regulatory authority over nuclear energy's uni-
que safety issues. Yet, that analysis also reveals that Pacific Gas broadened
the legitimate scope of state authority by permitting California to ban con-
5. The first commercially operated power reactor began operating in 1953. E. ROLPH,
NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY 55 (1979). By 1974, 46 nuclear power plants were
licensed to operate in the United States, 54 more were being built, and an additional 133 plants
were at various planning stages. Id. at 188.
6. Several commentators have written on the issue of state regulation of nuclear power.
See, e.g., Murphy & LaPierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy
Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (1976) (questioning whether
states' attempts to declare moratorium on nuclear reactors will survive judicial review); Parenteau,
Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants: A Constitutional Dilemma for the States, 6 ENVTL. L.
675 (1976) (state regulations might be carefully drawn so as to avoid preemption); Tribe, California
Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Pre-empted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679 (1979)
(California legislation should not be preempted because it is unconcerned with protection against
radiation hazards); Note, Nuclear Power Regulation: Defining the Scope of State Authority,
18 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (1976) (as risks and benefits of nuclear power become clearer, courts
may allow greater state participation in regulation); Note, Nuclear Power and Preemption: Op-
portunities for State Regulation, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117 (1978) (states risk preemption by
imposing safety standards more stringent than federal government's).
7. The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion the Eighth Circuit's decision in Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971) (Minnesota pollution control
requirements for radioactive emissions preempted by federal regulations), aff'd mem., 405 U.S.
1035 (1972). See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. Until 1983, the Supreme Court had
decided no case addressing the issue of federal preemption of state regulation of nuclear power.
The Court had, however, denied certiorari in cases dealing with this issue. See Washington
State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (state initiative
banning importation into state of low level nuclear waste fuel preempted by Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1891 (1983); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1977 did not give states authority to disrupt federal regulation of nuclear waste under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee
Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982) (state action for public nuisance, unlawful condem-
nation, and violation of state and municipal regulations not preempted when state complaint
does not refer to radiation hazards), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 469 (1982); Missouri ex rel. Utility
Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (Missouri
Public Service Commission preempted from assessing costs associated with unique risk of nuclear
power when comparing costs of nuclear and fossil power plants), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
8. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
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struction of nuclear power plants for economic reasons.' In addition to
analyzing the Court's decision in Pacific Gas, this Note will suggest.an alter-
native analysis that would uphold California's statute, while more clearly
delineating the division of regulatory authority between state and federal
government.
BACKGROUND
The doctrine of federal preemption is based upon the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution.'" Under that doctrine, a state law is in-
valid if it conflicts with federal legislation or regulation.'" This conflict often
becomes apparent when congressional intent is examined. Accordingly, when
the conflict between state and federal legislation is not obvious on the face
of the laws, courts look to the intent of Congress to determine whether a
state law is preempted by federal legislation or whether the law is a valid
exercise of concurrent authority.'2
Congressional intent to preempt state law may be either explicit or im-
plicit. Such intent is explicit when the federal statute declares that it supersedes
any and all state laws dealing with the same subject matter.' 3 If Congress
fails to include such explicit language in a statute, courts nevertheless may
infer a congressional intent to preempt state law.' 4 Such inferences generally
occur when the "scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to sup-
plement it."' 5 Congressional intent to preempt also may be inferred when
9. See infra text accompanying notes 124-37.
10. The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; any the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, para. 2; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)
(New York law regulating interstate ferry traffic preempted by federal act regulating coasting
trade).
11. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022
(1982); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
12.. See Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (in determining whether
Congress had precluded state enforcement of state laws "Itlhe purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone"); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("Congress may ...
take unto itself all regulatory authority . . . , share the task with the States, or adopt as federal
policy the state scheme of regulation. . . .The question in each case is what the purpose
of Congress was.").
13. See, e.g., Jones v. Ruth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (federal law which
explicitly prohibited requirements in addition to, or different from, federal requirements preempted
California law regulating weights and measures stated upon packaged commodities).
14. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3026
(1982) (although Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 did not explicitly preempt state law, statutory
language suggested that Congress contemplated and approved the promulgation of rules pre-
empting state law).
15. City of Burbank v. Lockheed City Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (pervasive scheme
of FAA and EPA regulation of aircraft noise implied congressional preemption of local regula-
tion) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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there is a paramount federal interest in a particular field.16
The intentions of Congress, however, are not the only guidelines that courts
have employed to preempt state laws. For example, a federal law will be
upheld, and a conflicting state law preempted, if compliance with both laws
is impossible.' 7 A state law will also be preempted if it "stands as an
obstacle" to the attainment of Congress's goals or objectives.'" Consequently,
a preemption analysis of a state nuclear energy regulation must begin with
a discussion of federal nuclear power legislation.
Federal regulation of nuclear energy developed in response to the military
potential of atomic fission.' 9 To prevent the diversion of nuclear materials
and technology to nonpeaceful uses, Congress passed the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 (1946 Act),2" which created the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC). Although the stated policies of the 1946 Act included encouraging
the development of peaceful uses for nuclear energy, the primary goal of
the Act was to maintain the defense and security of the United States.2
To achieve this goal, the 1946 Act established a federal monopoly over all
aspects of nuclear energy.2"
Under the federal monopoly, all research in the field of nuclear power
was conducted under the auspices of the federal government, either by federal
agencies or private industry under government contracts.23 In the early 1950's,
Congress recognized that reliance solely on governmental research and
development had not resulted in sufficiently rapid progress toward the goal
of developing peaceful uses for nuclear energy.2 4 Instead, Congress concluded,
16. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (when Congress has enacted laws
for regulation of aliens, dominant federal interest requires that state law in same field yield
to federal law).
17. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (Arizona law preempted because it was im-
possible to comply with both Arizona law, which provided that discharge in bankruptcy following
an automobile accident shall not relieve judgment debtor, and federal Bankruptcy Act, which
provides that a discharge in bankruptcy fully discharges debtor).
18. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (Pennsylvania act requiring alien registra-
tion preempted by federal law because it was as an obstacle to accomplishment of purposes
and objectives of Congress).
19. E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 12. For a history of the early development of nuclear power,
see generally Hogerton, The Arrival of Nuclear Power, 218 Sci. AM. 21 (1968). For a history
of federal regulation of nuclear power, see generally W. BERMAN & L. HYDEMAN, supra note
1, at 64-149; E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 21-29.
20. Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
21 See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 1(a) 60 Stat. 755, 756 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976 & Supp. V 1980)). The Act stated as follows:
[l]t is hereby declared . . . that, subject at all times to the paramount objective
of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of
atomic energy shall . . . be directed toward improving the public welfare . . . and
promoting world peace.
Id. (emphasis added).
22. See supra note I.
23. See id.
24. See S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3456, 3464.
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optimum development would result from a partnership between the federal
government and private industry.25 Consequently, Congress enacted the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (1954 Act).26
The 1954 Act terminated the federal monopoly over nuclear technology
by allowing private ownership of nuclear reactors,27 private use of nuclear
fuel,28 and industrial access to technical information.29 To a greater extent
than its predecessor, the 1954 Act emphasized peaceful uses of nuclear
energy." In addition, the later act reflected congressional awareness that pro-
tection of the public's health and safety should be a paramount concern
of the AEC.3' Nevertheless, the 1954 Act did not fully clarify the AEC's
role in regulating the nuclear industry for public safety. In particular, the
AEC was given no guidelines concerning the regulation of radiation hazards.
Furthermore, the 1954 Act did not address the relationships between the
AEC, the states, and other agencies, with respect to health and safety
matters.32
In 1959, Congress amended the 1954 Act to delineate the relationship be-
tween the AEC and the states.33 One purpose of the 1959 amendments was
to clarify the nuclear energy regulatory responsibilities of both the AEC and
the states. 4 A second purpose of those amendments was to establish a
cooperative program between the AEC and the states to control radiation
hazards.3" Subsection 274(b) of the 1959 amendments allowed the AEC to
enter into agreements that would permit states to assume regulatory authority
over specified nuclear materials.36 Subsection 274(c), however, mandated that
25. See id.
26. Pub. L. No. 86-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2061(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
28. Id. § 2073(a).
29. Id. § 2163.
30. The 1946 Act subordinated the goal of developing nuclear energy for the public welfare
to the goal of assuring the common defense and security. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 1(a), 60 Stat. 755, 756 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976 &
Supp. V 1980)). In contrast, the 1954 Act placed more emphasis on the development of atomic
energy to promote world peace, improve the general welfare, and increase the standard of liv-
ing. See 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013(d), 2021(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
32. The only section of the 1954 Act dealing with the relationship between the AEC and
states or other agencies was § 271. Section 271 provided that the 1954 Act was not to affect
the authority of state, local, or federal agencies with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission
of electric power produced by nuclear facilities. Id. § 2018.
33. An Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274, 73
Stat. 688 (1959) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
35. See id. § 2021(a)(2), (3).
36. Id. § 2021(b). This section authorizes the AEC to enter into agreements with the gover-
nor of any state. These agreements provide for the AEC to discontinue regulation of specified
materials and give the state authority to regulate those materials. The materials subject to such
a cooperative agreement are byproduct materials, source materials, and special nuclear materials
in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass. Id.
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the AEC retain authority over the construction and operation of nuclear
power plants, the import and export of nuclear materials, and the disposal
of nuclear waste materials.3 7 Yet, Congress did not intend the 1959 amend-
ments to affect state authority to regulate AEC licensees in areas of tradi-
tional state power.38 Accordingly, subsection 274(k) declared that the amend-
ments were not to be construed as affecting state authority to regulate all
aspects of nuclear energy other than radiation hazards.39
Subsections 274(b), (c), and (k) of the 1959 amendments have become the
focal points of debate as states have enacted a variety of measures in efforts
to control nuclear energy within their borders. 41 In response to these efforts,
the nuclear industry has asserted that subsection 274(c) totally prohibits states
from regulating any facet of nuclear plant construction and operation, nuclear
material importation and exportation, or nuclear waste disposal."' In con-
trast, the states have contended the subsection 274(k) allows them to regulate
nuclear energy for any reason unrelated to radiation safety. 42
Generally, state court decisions addressing the issue of federal preemption
of state nuclear energy regulations have invalidated state laws aimed at radia-
tion hazards.43 Conversely, state regulations that are not directed at radia-
37. Id. § 2021(c).
38. See S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2872, 2882-83. Thus, the amendments were not intended to impair state authority
to regulate activities of AEC licensees with respect to economics and non-radiation related health
and safety concerns. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k).
40. States have attempted to control nuclear energy in different ways. For examples of state
measures prohibiting the construction of new nuclear plants, see CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524
(West 1977 & Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-136 (West Supp. 1981-1982); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 3371-3376 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, app. § 3
(West Supp. 1983-1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-30-1201 to -1205 (1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 469.590 to .601 (1981). For examples of measures regulating nuclear waste disposal and
construction of nuclear waste disposal facilities, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-137 (West
Supp. 1981-1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1306.1 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 325.491
(West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-48 to -51 (1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125:77-b (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4A-11.1 (1981); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1854-a
(McKinney 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501-6506 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 16-27-2
(Supp. 1983). For examples of measures banning or regulating the transportation of nuclear
materials, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1112, § 230.22 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1111
(West Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.99.010 to 99.910 (Supp. 1983-1984). For
examples of measures requiring legislative approval for the construction of nuclear plants, see
HAWAII CONST. art. XI, § 8; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1.3-5 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30,
§ 248(c) (Supp. 1983).
41. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 9-21, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
42. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 41-55, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 111. App. 3d 800,
284 N.E.2d 342 (3rd Dist. 1972) (state statute authorizing regulation of radiation from nuclear
plants preempted by federal statute); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237,
237 N.W.2d 266 (1975) (state courts preempted by federal law from considering plaintiff's allega-
tion regarding the workability of a nuclear reactor's emergency core cooling system); Missouri
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tion hazards generally have been upheld." Lower federal courts have similarly
found preemption of state laws regulating radiation hazards. 5 Prior to Pacific
Gas, the Supreme Court had never directly confronted the issue of state
regulation of nuclear power plants.
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota"6 presented the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to address the state regulation issue. The Court declined
this opportunity and instead affirmed, without opinion, the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 7 The court of ap-
peals held that Minnesota Pollution Control Agency regulations were preemp-
ted by the Atomic Energy Act.48 The preempted state regulations imposed
requirements, stricter than those imposed by the AEC, on radioactive water
and gas emissions from nuclear power plants. Relying on subsection 274(c)
of the 1959 amendments, which requires the AEC to retain control of the
construction and operation of nuclear plants,49 the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that Minnesota's attempt to control radioactive emissions was an effort to
regulate nuclear power plant operation." Hence, in Northern States Power,
the court concluded that subsection 274(k) of the 1959 amendments implicitly
reserved regulation of radiation hazards to the federal government, because
that statutory provision explicitly allowed state regulation for only non-
radiation related purposes. 5
The Supreme Court faced a different issue in Train v. Colorado Public
ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct. App.)
(Missouri Public Service Commission preempted from considering costs associated with unique
radiation risks of nuclear power when comparing costs of nuclear and fossil fuel power plants),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978); Van Dissell v. Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co., 181 N.J.
Super. 516, 438 A.2d 563 (1981) (assertion of tort and statutory claims brought in state court
for damages allegedly caused by thermal pollution from nuclear reactor's cooling system were
preempted because plant's cooling system is integrally related to the control of radiation hazards).
44. See, e.g., Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head Harbor, Inc. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964) (state may consider safety
questions apart from radiological hazards such as location of nuclear plant near active earth-
quake fault zone); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 655 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266
(1975) (state is not preempted from considering non-radiological hazards of nuclear plant, such
as the creation of steam, fog, or ice from cooling pond, under common law nuisance theory).
45. See cases cited supra note 7; In re TMI Litig. Gov't Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp.
853 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (federal law preempts claim alleging public nuisance arising out of nuclear
accident at Three Mile Island nuclear plant); United States v. New York, 463 F. Supp. 604
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (New York City requirement that university obtain a city operating license
to operate a nuclear reactor was preempted by federal authority to license for radiological health
and safety).
46. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1036 (1972).
47. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). The Supreme Court's affirmance of Northern States Power pro-
vided little guidance for the lower federal courts. A summary affirmance is an affirmance only
of the judgment below and "is not to be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting
the judgment under review." Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 n.13 (1982).
48. 447 F.2d at 1154.
49. Id. at 1149.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1150.
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Interest Research Group. 2 Train did not address the relationship between
the authority of the AEC and the states. Instead, the Train decision ad-
dressed the authority of the AEC in relation to another federal agency, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In Train, a public interest group
claimed that under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,53 the EPA had
responsibility for regulating the emission of nuclear fuel materials into
waterways."4 Refusing to include nuclear fuel materials on the agency's list
of monitored substances, the Administrator of the EPA contended that in-
clusion of such materials would infringe upon the AEC's authority. The
Supreme Court agreed with the EPA Administrator that the control of nuclear
fuel materials was within the exclusive province of the AEC.5
The Northern States Power and Train decisions suggested how the Court
might later interpret the relationship between the states and the federal govern-
ment regarding control over nuclear energy. 6 The Supreme Court's action
in Northern States Power indicated that there was a limit to the states'
authority to regulate nuclear power; it also revealed that Minnesota's regula-
tion of radioactive emissions from nuclear plants went beyond that limit. 7
Yet, the Court's summary affirmance did not delineate the bounds of valid
state authority. Similarly, while it did not directly address the question of
state authority, Train revealed that certain aspects of nuclear regulation were
to be exercised only by the federal agencies responsible for regulating nuclear
power." The Train Court, however, did not catalogue all of the aspects of
nuclear regulation that were within the exclusive province of such agencies.
It was not until 1983, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission,59 that the Supreme
Court further defined the extent of state authority to regulate nuclear power.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
In 1974, the California legislature enacted the Warren-Alquist State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Act (Warren-Alquist Act),6" which
established the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Com-
mission (Energy Commission) to coordinate energy research and regulation
at the state level.' The Act requires that a utility obtain certification from
52. 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
53. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
54. 426 U.S. at 4.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Until the Pacific Gas decision in 1983, Northern States Power and Train were the only
Supreme Court cases dealing with the nature of federal authority under the Atomic Energy Act.
57. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
58. 426 U.S. at 23-24 & n.20.
59. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
60. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25968 (West 1977).
61. Id. § 25200. To fulfill its statutory obligations, the Energy Commission was given authority
over energy planning, conservation, resource management, research and development, and the
regulation of power plants. Id. § 25216.
[Vol. 33:371
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the Energy Commission before constructing or modifying any power plant. 2
In 1976, the California legislature amended the Warren-Alquist Act by add-
ing three sections applying only to nuclear power plants. 63 One of these
amendments, section 25524.2 of the California Public Resources Code, pro-
hibits certification of a nuclear plant until the state legislature determines
that the federal government has adopted a method for the permanent disposal
of high-level nuclear waste .6
In 1978, Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern California Electric (the
utilities) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California, challenging several sections of the Warren-Alquist Act, in-
cluding section 25524.2.65 The utilities alleged that California's plan for
62. The certification procedure is set forth in CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25500-25542 (West
1977). The procedure, which is required for non-nuclear as well as nuclear power plants, en-
compasses two steps. First, any utility planning the construction or modification of a power
plant must file a notice of intention with the Energy Commission. This notice must include
information about the need for additional generating facilities, the proposed design of the facilities,
and the location and merits of alternative sites for the facilities. Id. §§ 25502, 25504. The
Energy Commission then is required to hold hearings and make findings based on the data
gathered by the Energy Commission. Id. §§ 25505-25516.5 If the notice of intention is ap-
proved, the utility must apply to the Energy Commission for certification before beginning
construction. Id. § 25517. The application must contain a detailed description of the proposed
plant's design, construction, operation, safety, and reliability, as well as a specification of fuel
to be used and a projection of fuel and generating costs. Id. § 25520.
Once the utility has applied for certification, there is a second set of Energy Commission
hearings. The Commission then prepares an environmental impact statement, invites comments
from local agencies and the California Public Utility Commission, and makes recommenda-
tions regarding rate structure and economic reliability. Id. § 25579. Finally, the Energy Com-
mission must issue a written decision, including specifications regarding how the plant is to
be designed and operated to protect public health and safety and environmental quality. Id.
§ 25523.
63. Id. § 25524.1-3. These three 1976 amendments became known as the "Nuclear Laws."
Section 25524.1 prohibits construction of nuclear plants requiring the reprocessing of fuel rods,
until the federal government approves a technology for reprocessing such rods. In addition,
§ 25524.1 requires that nuclear plants have temporary storage for nuclear waste materials. Id.
§ 25524.1. Section 25524.3 prohibits construction of nuclear plants until the Energy Commis-
sion completes a study of underground and berm (earthen mound) containment of nuclear reac-
tors. Id. § 25524.3. For the text of § 25524.2, see infra note 64.
64. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980). The statute provides in part:
No nuclear fission thermal power plant . . . shall be permitted land use in the
state, or where applicable, be certified by the Commission until both conditions
(a) and (b) have been met:
(a) The Commission finds that there has been developed and that the United
States through its authorized agency has approved and there exists a demonstrated
technology or means for the disposal of high level nuclear waste.
(b) The commission has reported its findings and the reasons therefore pursuant
to paragraph (a) to the Legislature.
Id.
65. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
489 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal.), rev'd sub nom. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
The utilities challenged §§ 25500, 25502, 25504, 25511, 25512, 25514, 25516, 25517, 25520,
25523, 25528, 25532, and 25524.1-.3 of the California Public Resources Code. Id. at 700.
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regulating the certification of nuclear power plants was preempted by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.6 The district court ruled that the challenged
sections of the Warren-Alquist Act were preempted by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and, consequently, granted the utilities' motion for summary
judgment on that issue.67 Relying upon Northern States Power,68 the court
concluded that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave the federal government
exclusive authority to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear
power plants. 9
The Energy Commission appealed the district court decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,"0 which held that only sec-
tion 25524.2 and one other challenged section were ripe for review; 7' the
remaining sections challenged by the utilities were declared to be either moot
or not ripe for review.7 Reversing the district court's summary judgment
with respect to the sections found ripe for review,73 the Ninth Circuit held
that the challenged sections were not preempted by federal regulation.74 In
contrast to the district court ruling, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 as indicating Congress's intent to preempt only state
regulation of the radiation hazards associated with nuclear power.75 Accord-
ing to the court of appeals, state regulation for purposes other than control
of radiation hazards specifically was not preempted.76 Therefore, whether
66. 489 F. Supp. at 700. Pacific Gas and Electric asserted standing to sue based on an
injury in fact argument, claiming that the Warren-Alquist Act and its 1976 amendments forced
the company to cancel plans for a specific nuclear plant on which it had already spent several
million dollars in preliminary planning. Id. at 701. Similarly, Southern California Electric claimed
it had abandoned tentative plans to build two nuclear plants because of the uncertainties created
by California's regulatory scheme. Id. at 702.
67. Id. at 704.
68. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Northern States Power, see supra
notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
69. 489 F. Supp. at 703. Based on the Supreme Court's affirmance of Northern States
Power, the district court rejected the contention that the 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy
Act ended exclusive federal control over the construction and operation of nuclear plants. Id.
70. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 659
F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983). Pacific Gas was consolidated by the
court of appeals with Pacific Legal Foundation. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court denied
certiori for Pacific Legal Foundation. 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982).
71. 659 F.2d at 917-18. The second section the court found to be ripe for review was
§ 25503, which requires a utility to submit three alternate sites in its notice of intention to con-
struct or modify a plant. See CAL. RES. CODE § 25503 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
72. 659 F.2d at 915-18. Section 25524.3 imposed a moratorium on the construction of nuclear
plants until a study of the feasibility of underground and berm (earthen mound) containment
was submitted to the California legislature. Since the specified report was adopted before the
Ninth Circuit's decision, the challenge to § 25524.3 was declared moot. The remaining statutes
challenged in the district court were held not ripe for review either because the issues presented
required further factual development, or because the statutes had no present effect. Id. at 916-17.
73. Id. at 928.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 922.
76. Id. at 921. In support of its finding that state regulation for purposes other than radia-
tion control is not preempted, the court of appeals cited examples of valid authority in other
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the challenged sections were aimed at radiation hazards was crucial to the
appellate court's decision.
To determine whether the challenged sections were directed at radiation
hazards, the Ninth Circuit examined the legislative history of the 1976 amend-
ments to the Warren-Alquist Act. 7 The court relied on a report, published
by the California Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy
(the Committee), 8 which classified the problem of no federally approved
method of nuclear waste disposal as an economic, and not a safety related,
problem." According to the court, the Committee report determined that
the lack of an approved method of waste disposal could disrupt the opera-
tion of nuclear power plants.8 " This potential for disruption led the Com-
mittee to conclude that without an approved waste disposal method, nuclear
power is an uneconomical and uncertain source of energy.' Thus, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the California legislature had chosen to require util-
ity companies to rely upon other energy sources until "the economic uncer-
tainties associated with nuclear power are resolved." 2
Although the Ninth Circuit determined that Congress neither explicitly nor
implicitly intended to preempt the challenged state statutes,83 the court sub-
jected the statutes to two additional tests of federal preemption. First, the
court examined the statutes to determine if compliance with both federal
and state regulations was impossible; if so, the state statutes would be
preempted. " In addition, the court held that the statutes would be preemp-
ted if they stood as an obstacle to achievement of federal objectives.85
The court of appeals summarily concluded that compliance with both
federal and state regulations was possible.86 The court then examined Con-
gress's objectives in passing the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to determine
areas. Id. For example, the Ninth Circuit cited New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969). In that case, the AEC conceded
that state authorities had jurisdiction to deal with environmental considerations. Id. at 173.
Similarly, economic considerations were deemed to be within the scope of state authority in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519,
550 (1978) (AEC hearing procedures held to be within statutory authority under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
77. 659 F.2d at 924-25.
78. The California Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy was the com-
mittee that introduced the bills which ultimately became § 25524.1-3. Id. at 924.
79. Id. at 924-25.
80. Id. at 924. For example, without an approved method for waste disposal, a nuclear
power plant may be forced to shut down operation when it runs out of temporary storage
space for nuclear waste. Id. See generally R. NADER & J. ABOTTS, THE MENACE OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY, 143-47 (1977).
81. 659 F.2d at 924.
82. Id. at 925.
83. Id. at 926.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. On appeal to the Supreme Court, this contention was apparently uncontested by
the parties.
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whether California's challenged statutes impermissibly obstructed those
objectives."1 According to the court, Congress "struck a balance between
state and federal power to regulate." 8 This balance indicated that Congress
did not intend to promote nuclear energy at all costs.s9 In addition to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the court of appeals considered recent Con-
gressional action to be indicative of the "balanced approach." In several
instances, Congress had explicitly allowed states to regulate nuclear power
plants.9" Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the challenged California
statutes did not obstruct congressional goals. 9'
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court granted Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric Company's petition for certiorari.92 The Court limited its inquiry to the
issue of the ripeness and validity of two sections of the 1976 amendments
to the Warren-Alquist Act.93 By upholding the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the issues surrounding subsection 25524.1(b) were not ripe for review, 9 4
the Pacific Gas Court reached the merits only of the utilities' challenge to
87. Id.
88. Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the power retained by the states over environmen-
tal, economic, and similar matters gave the states sufficient power to deny certification for
an unneeded or uneconomical power plant. The court of appeals concluded that this state power
is inconsistent with the congressional goal of promoting nuclear power at all costs. Id. Further,
the court concluded that the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat.
1233 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), was evidence of
a change in congressional outlook. Since the Energy Reorganization Act emphasized promotion
of non-nuclear energy sources, the court reasoned that this emphasis indicated a weakening
of congressional policy to promote nuclear energy. 659 F.2d at 927.
89. 659 F.2d at 927.
90. Id. The Ninth Circuit cited the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
§ 122, 91 Stat. 720 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (Supp. 111 1979)), which gave
states "the authority to regulate radioactive air emissions from nuclear plants." 659 F.2d at
927. The Clean Air Act Amendments were intended to overturn Northern States Power with
respect to air emissions. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 n.8, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1121 n.8; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 143, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1502, 1523-24. Although this
grant of authority might have placed a burden on the nuclear industry, Congress concluded
that the burden was not impermissible. In addition, the court cited the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133-2134 (Supp. V 1981),
which authorized the states to enforce plant siting and land use requirements more stringent
than those of the NRC. Id.
91. 659 F.2d at 927.
92. 457 U.S. 1132 (1982).
93. See 103 S. Ct. at 1720.
94. Id. Section 25524.1(b) conditioned certification upon a finding by the Energy Commis-
sion that the proposed nuclear plant would have adequate temporary storage for spent nuclear
fuel. Because the findings required in § 25524.1(b) were to be made on a case-by-case basis,
the Court concluded that it was uncertain whether the Energy Commission would ever find
a nuclear plant's storage capacity to be inadequate. Further, because § 25524.2 was held to
be valid, the Court saw little likelihood that § 25524.1(b) would have any significant impact
upon the nuclear industry. Id. at 1721-22.
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section 25524.2. That challenge presented the Court with the issue of whether
section 25524.211 was preempted by federal law.
In holding that section 25524.2 was not preempted by federal law,96 the
Court ruled that states have the authority to prohibit construction of nuclear
power plants when such prohibitions have an economic rationale.97 To reach
its holding, the Court addressed three distinct preemption issues.
First, the Court considered whether Congress intended to preempt state
nuclear energy regulations that condition new plant construction upon the
availability of a federally approved waste disposal site. The Court examined
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, its history, and its amendments, and re-
jected the utilities' contention that the Act was "intended to preserve the
federal government as the sole regulator of all matters nuclear. . . -98 In-
stead, the Court stated that Congress intended to establish a dual regulatory
system in the field of nuclear energy.9 Under this system, the federal govern-
ment regulated the radiation safety aspects of the construction and opera-
tion of nuclear plants while the states retained their authority over issues
of need, reliability, cost, and related traditional state concerns."'0
Acknowledging this division of regulatory authority, the Pacific Gas Court
next declared that section 25524.2 was not an attempt "to regulate the con-
struction or operation of a nuclear power plant"; 0.' such a regulation would
conflict with exclusive Nuclear Regulatory Commission'0 2 authority over plant
construction and operation and, hence, would be preempted.' °3 Furthermore,
the Court stated that a statute, such as section 25524.2, would be preemp-
ted if it were enacted to regulate safety concerns because the federal govern-
ment has exclusive authority over radiation safety.' 4 The Supreme Court
concluded, however, that Congress did not intend to preempt laws prohibiting
the construction of nuclear plants if those laws were directed toward con-
cerns other than radiation hazards.0 5 Accordingly, the existence of a non-
safety rationale for section 25524.2 became a dispositive factor in the Pacific
Gas holding.
To determine whether a non-safety rationale existed, the Pacific Gas Court
reviewed the California legislative report upon which the Ninth Circuit relied
95. Section 25524.2 conditioned certification of new nuclear plants upon a finding by the
Energy Commission that the United States had approved a technology for the disposal of nuclear
waste. See supra note 64.
96. 103 S. Ct. at 1732-33.
97. Id. at 1731-32.
98. Id. at 1722.
99. Id. at 1726.
100. Id. Traditional state concerns include determinations regarding land use, ratemaking,
and the type of generating facilities to be licensed. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 2.
103. 103 S. Ct. at 1726.
104. Id. at 1726-27. The Court, however, excepted the limited powers expressly delegated
to the states by the federal government. See supra note 3.
105. 103 S. Ct. at 1725-26.
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to conclude that section 25524.2 was directed at economic concerns.', 6
Although the utilities contested the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, °7 the
Supreme Court adopted California's avowed economic purpose as the ra-
tionale for section 25524.2.108 Consequently, the Court concluded that the
statute did not intrude upon the exclusive federal authority existing under
Congress's dual regulatory system.' °9
Another preemption issue that the Pacific Gas Court addressed was whether
section 25524.2 conflicted with federal regulation of nuclear waste disposal.' '°
The Court determined that the responsibilities Congress delegated to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy established
exclusive federal authority in the field of nuclear waste disposal."' Nuclear
Regulatory Commission regulations, however, were directed toward ensur-
ing that nuclear waste storage and disposal were safe, not necessarily that
they were economical.'' 2 Because the Court accepted the rationale that sec-
tion 25524.2 was directed at economic problems, the Court found no con-
flict with Nuclear Regulatory Commission authority to provide safe nuclear
waste disposal." 3 Moreover, the Court emphasized that in enacting section
25524.2, California had not sought to impose its own standards on nuclear
waste disposal, but rather it had recognized that it was the federal govern-
ment's responsibility to resolve the nuclear waste storage and disposal
problem.' 4
106. Id. at 1727; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
107. The petitioner-utilities and the United States, as amicus curiae, presented four arguments.
First, they contended that § 25524.2 was not concerned with the economics of nuclear power
because it failed to consider the cost of permanent disposal once a technology had been ap-
proved by the federal government. Brief of United States as amicus curiae at 22 n.23, Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713
(1983). The Court dismissed this contention by noting that cost estimates for the disposal of
nuclear waste cannot be made until a technology has been selected. 103 S. Ct. at 1727.
Second, the amicus curiae maintained that if California was concerned with economics, it
would have prohibited California utilities from building nuclear power plants outside of the
state. The Court found no indication that California utilities were planning to build plants
outside the state and concluded that California need not solve purely hypothetical problems. Id.
Third, the United States and the utilities suggested that the presence of another body, the
Califonia Public Utilities Commission, which considers the economics of proposed power plants,
indicated that § 25524.2 could not have been directed toward economic concerns. Accord-
ing to the Court, the existence of a procedure to determine economic reliability on a case-by-
case basis does not preclude a state from making judgments that apply in all circumstances. Id.
Finally, the amicus curiae claimed that because § 25524.2 arose in response to an anti-nuclear
public referendum, and because §§ 25524.1 and 25524.3 seemed to have been written as safety
measures, § 25524.2 must have been enacted in response to safety concerns. In response,
the Court declared that the intent behind provisions not before it did not taint § 25524.2. Id.
108. 103 S. Ct. at 1727.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1729. Petitioners claimed that storage and disposal of nuclear waste was exclusively
regulated by federal authority and that § 25524.2 infringed upon that exclusive authority. Id.
111. Id. at 1730.
112. Id. at 1729-30.
113. Id. at 1730.
114. Id. In addition, the Court concluded that passage of the. Nuclear Waste Policy Act
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The final preemption issue addressed by the Pacific Gas Court was whether
section 25524.2 impermissibly frustrated the goals or objectives of Congress.' 5
The Court examined the Atomic Energy Act and other legislation to deter-
mine Congress's objectives with respect to nuclear energy.6 Although the
Supreme Court disagreed with part of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
Congress's objectives in this area,' 7 it accepted the lower court's conclusion
that "the promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished 'at all
costs.' " 18 Moreover, the Court noted that Congress has given the states
authority to slow or stop the development of nuclear power for economic
reasons.' 9 The Court reasoned that because Congress has allowed the states
to retain this authority, it was for Congress, and not for the courts, to deter-
mine when this state authority obstructs a federal objective.,2"
The Pacific Gas Court found section 25524.2 to be within the state's
legitimate authority to regulate nuclear power.' 2 Additionally, the Court con-
cluded that by enacting section 25524.2, California had not attempted to
enter the exclusively federal province of nuclear waste disposal regulation. 2
Finally, the Court stated that Congress, not the Court, should determine
what kind of state regulation obstructs congressional objectives.'2 3 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court held section 25524.2 to be a valid exercise of
California's authority to regulate nuclear power. '24
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-10226 (1983)),
did not alter the relation between federal nuclear waste policy and § 25524.2. 103 S. Ct. at 1730.
115. 103 S. Ct. at 1730.
116. Id. at 1731.
117. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that passage of the Energy Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976), indicated a diminishing congressional con-
cern for promoting nuclear energy. The Court found instead that the legislation was drafted
to avoid any anti-nuclear sentiment. 103 S. Ct. at 1731.
118. 103 S. Ct. at 1731 (quoting Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1980)).
119. Id. at 1732.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
124. 103 S. Ct. at 1731-32. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in the
Court's judgment. Justice Blackmun, however, disagreed with the Court's dictum that a law
prohibiting nuclear plants, which was motivated by safety concerns, would be preempted. Id.
at 1732 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Initially, Justice Blackmun rejected the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Atomic Energy Act as preventing states from considering nuclear safety issues.
Id. at 1732-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring). According to Justice Blackmun, the Court's inter-
pretation prevented states from weighing the safety concerns of nuclear power against the risks,
costs, and benefits of other available options. See id. at 1733 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun also noted that the federal government is not authorized to choose which technology
should be used by utilities to meet energy needs. Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded, the
Court's analysis created a regulatory vacuum which prevents any regulatory agency from com-
prehensively evaluating nuclear energy in relation to available alternative energy sources. Justice
Blackmun maintained that the correct interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act would limit
exclusive federal authority to the actual construction and operation of a nuclear plant once
a state had pemaitted such construction. He concluded that the threshold determination of whether
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ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
According to the Pacific Gas Court, the classification of section 25524.2
was determinative.' 2 5 The Court would have found section 25524.2 preemp-
ted had it been unable to establish a non-safety rationale for the challenged
law.' 26 Instead, the Court concluded that an economic rationale supported
section 25524.2.127
This conclusion was significant for two reasons. First, the finding of an
economic rationale for section 25524.2 was significant because it indicated
the Supreme Court's acceptance of the proposition that nuclear waste disposal
is an economic problem. Although it has been acknowledged that disruption
of the nuclear fuel cycle has economic consequences,' 28 the attention given
to the issue of nuclear waste storage and disposal has most often focused
on the hazards to public safety, rather than on the cost of generating
electricity. " Indeed, one study concluded that the costs of spent fuel storage
and disposal would not contribute substantially to the cost of electricity. 
30
The Pacific Gas Court, however, seemed to accept the idea that economic
consequences are a primary reason for concern over nuclear waste disposal.' 31
Thus, the Court's acceptance of an economic rationale represented a depar-
ture from the predominant perception of the nature of the nuclear waste
disposal issue.
Second, finding an economic rationale for section 25524.2 was significant
because the Supreme Court did not attempt to determine California's
legislative motive or intent in enacting the law. Although the Court referred
to the legislative history of section 25524.232 and cited the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of that section,' 3 the Court did not attempt to ascertain in-
dependently the state's true motive.' 34 The Court's failure to do so was con-
sistent with the established view that the Supreme Court should not inquire
to permit construction belonged to the states, and that the decision should include a considera-
tion of nuclear energy's safety risks. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 1726.
126. Id. at 1726-27. As the Court declared, "A state moratorium on nuclear construction
grounded in safety concerns falls squarely in the prohibited field." Id.
127. Id. at 1728.
128. See R. NADER & J. ABOTTS, supra note 80, at 147.
129. See, e.g., id. at 148-50; Cohen, The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from Fission Reac-
tors, 236 Sci. AM. 21 (June 1977). It has also been noted that it is virtually impossible to
separate health and safety issues from the economic issues of nuclear waste. Murphy & LaPierre,
supra note 6, at 453.
130. See NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES AND CHOICES 122
(1977).
131. 103 S. Ct. at 1727-28; see also supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
132. 103 S. Ct. at 1727.
133. Id. (citing Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
659 F.2d 903, 925 (9th Cir. 1980)).
134. See id. at 1728. The Pacific Gas Court refused to undertake this task for two reasons.
First, it noted the difficulty inherent in ascertaining the collective motive of a group of in-
dividuals. Second, the Court found such an inquiry to be pointless because the state had suffi-
cient authority to stop construction of nuclear power plants on economic grounds. Id.
[Vol. 33:371
19841 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
into legislative motive.'35 Despite contentions that it is proper for the Court
to inquire into legislative motive, 36 whether California was truly motivated
by economic concerns seemed immaterial to the Pacific Gas Court's holding.
Although the Court did not independently ascertain California's true
motive, the legislative history of section 25524.2 suggested what the Energy
Commission had argued: the regulation was aimed at economic problems.
Yet, because the Pacific Gas Court failed to disclose whether it was influenced
by the rationale proffered by the State of California, it is uncertain whether
the state law would have been upheld regardless of the apparent aims of
the state legislature. If the Supreme Court applied a "rational relation" test,'37
135. See, e.g., Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205 (1970). Professor Ely suggests that judicial inquiry into motive is appropriate in two
situations. First, inquiry is appropriate when the challenged governmental choice is random.
A random choice involves selecting a group for different treatment when there is no basis
for selecting one particular group as more qualified than another. Examples of random choices
are the selection of jurors and the drawing of boundary lines for voting districts. Id. at 1230-35.
Second, inquiry into motive is appropriate when the attacked governmental choice is discre-
tionary. A discretionary choice is one in which the government must make a value choice, such
as determining the appropriate attire for high school students, or one in which the government
must select among equally acceptable goals, such as determining tax rates and subsidies. Even
in these instances, when inquiry into motive is appropriate, the existence of an illicit motive
does not invalidate the choice; instead, it triggers the need for a legitimate justification. In
most cases, a legitimate justification is a rational relationship between the choice under attack
and a legitimate goal. If the group disadvantaged by the choice is a suspect class, then legitimate
justification will require a compelling defense of the governmental choice. In all other cases,
Professor Ely maintains, inquiry into legislative motive is inappropriate because a legitimate
justification for the governmental choice is required from the beginning. Hence, there is no
need to investigate the legislative motivation. Id. at 1235-49.
The governmental choice made under § 25524.2, and challenged in Pacific Gas, was neither
random nor discretionary as those terms are used by Professor Ely. Therefore, his model merely
required a legitimate justification for the choice, and inquiry into California's motive was not
appropriate. The Court found an economic rationale to be a legitimate justification for § 25524.2;
consequently, § 25524.2 was a valid governmental choice. See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 208-21 (1962). But see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the
Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95 (1971). Professor Brest's
conclusion is that courts should inquire into motive whenever a governmental action is alleged
to be the result of an illicit motive. If clear and convincing evidence shows that the illicit
motive played an affirmative role in the decision-making process, then the action should be
invalidated. The illicit motive need not have been the sole or even dominant factor in the deci-
sion. Id. at 130-31.
Under Professor Brest's model, the result in Pacific Gas might have been different. While
the Court found an economic rationale for § 25524.2, it did not state whether safety motives
'played an affirmative role in its passage. If safety motives affected the passage of § 25524.2,
then it would be invalid under Professor Brest's approach.
136. The Supreme Court itself has engaged in motivational inquiries. See, e.g., Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (Court looked beyond avowed secular purpose and held that
the preeminent purpose of the law was plainly religious, rendering the law invalid under the
establishment clause); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977) (historical background, departure from normal procedure, and legislative
history are proper subjects of judicial inquiry to determine discriminatory purpose).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973) (statute invalidated
because challenged classification furthered no legitimate governmental interest); Allied Stores
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requiring only that the statute bear a rational relation to a legitimate state
interest, it would not be necessary for that interest to be articulated by the
state. Almost every attempt to control nuclear power plants could be ra-
tionalized in economic terms sufficient to satisfy this minimal requirement. 38
Thus, section 25524.2 might have been upheld even if its legislative history
suggested that it was directed towards control of radiation hazards, a pur-
pose that would conflict with federal law.' 39
The dual system of nuclear power regulation summarized by the Pacific
Gas Court' ° created a gap between state and federal regulatory authority.
The Court concluded that among the traditional powers retained by the states
was the authority to determine the type of generating facility to be licensed;''
yet, it denied states the power to consider radiation safety when exercising
that authority.' 42 Moreover, the Court further concluded that the federal
government had no authority to determine the type of facility to be licensed.' 3
Thus, in the wake of Pacific Gas, while states cannot consider safety when
determining whether to permit construction of nuclear power plants, the
federal government cannot make any determination as to the type of facility
to be constructed. Consequently, no regulatory agency may consider the radia-
tion safety of nuclear power when determining the choice of technology a
state should use to meet its energy needs.
The existence of this regulatory vacuum was recognized by Justice
Blackmun'" and by various commentators.' One commentator has sug-
gested that if laws that allow states to consider safety factors when deter-
mining the type of facilities to be built are invalidated on preemption grounds,
the ultimate decision of whether to build a nuclear power plant will be made
v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-29 (1959) (although statute's legislative purpose was unclear, it
was upheld because the legislature may reasonably have had a legitimate purpose and policy).
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2, 16-3, at 994-96 (1978) (discussing
the requirements of the rational relation test).
138. For example, a state could argue that the presence of a nuclear plant within its borders
would create a risk, however slight, that a catastrophic accident might occur. In order to be
prepared for such an accident, the state might argue, it would be required to spend state resources
to improve its disaster and public health facilities. This required expenditure would have an
adverse impact on state finances and could arguably provide a rationale to prevent the con-
struction of nuclear power plants.
139. See supra notes 100 & 104 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
141. 103 S. Ct. at 1726.
142. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
143. See 103 S. Ct. at 1726. The Pacific Gas Court cited to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), in which the Court stated
that the prime concern of the Atomic Energy Commission in the context of licensing was "na-
tional security, public health, and safety." Id. at 550.
144. See 103 S. Ct. at 1733 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145. See, e.g., Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California's Nuclear
Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 3, 64 (1979-1980) (discussing California
nuclear law with respect to balancing of federal and state regulatory power); Note, May a
State Say "No" to Nuclear Power? Pacific Legal Foundation Gives a Disappointing Answer,
10 ENVTL. L. 189, 199-200 (1979-1980) (criticizing district court decision in Pacific Legal Foun-
dation) [hereinafter cited as Note, Disappointing Answer].
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only by the utility company seeking to build new facilities. '46 It is inap-
propriate to leave such an important decision to the utility companies. 14
It has also been suggested that when preemption of a state law would create
such a regulatory gap, the Court should uphold the state law, leaving Con-
gress the option to reverse the Court through subsequent legislation.' 4 8 In-
deed, the Court's own interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act was that
"it is almost inconceivable that Congress would have left a regulatory
vacuum."'
9
To avoid creating this vacuum, the Pacific Gas Court should have drawn
a different line between state and federal authority. One alternative to the
Court's interpretation of the dual regulatory system would have been to allow
the states exclusive authority to make the initial determination as to whether
nuclear plants can be constructed within their boundaries. Under this alter-
native, exclusive federal authority over construction and operation of nuclear
plants would not begin until after a state had decided to permit such plants. '
While this alternative would not eliminate the distinction drawn in Pacific
Gas between safety related and non-safety related state regulations, it would
make that distinction irrelevant when a state law regulated the initial deter-
mination regarding whether to permit nuclear plant construction.' 5 ' Since
the law challenged in Pacific Gas regulated this determination, the Court
would not have been required to classify section 25524.2 as either safety
or non-safety related under this alternative division of regulatory authority.
IMPACT
The Supreme Court decision in Pacific Gas is significant because it sug-
gests that states have some authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
to control the construction of nuclear power plants. The Pacific Gas Court
upheld the right of states to ban the construction of nuclear power plants
on economic grounds. According to the Court, however, states have no
authority to prevent the construction of nuclear plants when motivated by
safety concerns.'
146. Wiggins, supra note 145, at 64.
147. See id.
148. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 654 (1975).
149. 103 S. Ct. at 1724.
150. This alternative was suggested by Justice Blackmun. See id. at 1733 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Other courts and commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., Missouri
ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688, 698 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) ("The federal government regulates how nuclear power plants will be constructed
and maintained; the State of Missouri regulates whether they will be constructed.") (emphasis
in original); Wiggins, supra note 145, at 64; Note, Disappointing Answer, supra note 145, at 199.
151. Under the alternative proposed in this Note, states could choose not to permit construc-
tion for any reason. After permission had been given for construction of a nuclear plant, states
would be limited to regulation for non-safety related reasons.
152. In addition to its conclusion regarding the division of federal and state authority, the
Supreme Court suggested two reasons why a safety-motivated moratorium would be preempted.
First, the Court stated that a measure regulating nuclear plant construction in response to safe-
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It is difficult to predict the impact of Pacific Gas. Although the Court
reaffirmed the system of dual regulation, as established under the Atomic
Energy Act, the acceptance of an economic rationale for section 25524.2
broadened the scope of state power to control nuclear energy. As a result
of this wider scope, state statutes controlling construction of nuclear plants
will likely be upheld in future cases if an economic rationale is advanced
for the challenged statutes. Yet, if the division of authority between state
and federal government is to have any meaning, state measures directed solely
at safety problems must continue to be found preempted as a usurpation
of exclusive federal authority. Pacific Gas, however, failed to indicate the
extent to which a state could exercise its valid authority before it invaded
the province of exclusive federal control.
Several states have passed statutes attempting to control the construction of
nuclear power plants. 3 Whether a particular statute will be preempted depends
upon whether the courts find that the statute has a safety or a non-safety rationale.
State statutes that appear to be directed solely at economic concerns" 4 will most
likely be upheld as valid exercises of state authority under the Pacific Gas deci-
sion. No state statutes currently in force appear to be directed solely at safety
concerns. If a state were to pass such a statute, it would most likely be pre-
empted as an intrusion into an area of exclusive federal authority. Most of the
existing state statutes, however, either indicate no legislative purpose'" or
ty concerns would be preempted because it would directly conflict with the NRC's judgment
that nuclear plants can be safely constructed. 103 S. Ct. at 1727. Yet, the judgment of the
NRC is that such plants can be safely constructed, not that nuclear power is the safest energy
option available to states. A state should be allowed to consider the relative safety of nuclear
power when choosing among the available alternative energy sources. A judgment that another
source of energy may be safer than nuclear power does not conflict with the NRC assertion
that nuclear power is safe.
The Pacific Gas Court also stated that a safety-motivated moratorium would "be in the
teeth of the . . . objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread
development and use ... " Id. Such a moratorium, however, would not interfere with that objec-
tive. The refusal to utilize nuclear energy does not prevent the federal government from insur-
ing that nuclear energy is safe when it is used. As noted above, a state may enact a moratorium
not because it has determined that nuclear power is unsafe but because there are safer sources
of energy available. Further, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981),
the Court held that general policy statements encouraging the use of coal did not preempt
all state legislation with an adverse impact on that energy source. Therefore, even if a safety-
motivated moratorium had an adverse impact on the objectives of the Atomic Energy Act,
that impact would not mandate the preemption of such a moratorium.
153. See infra notes 154-56.
154. See OR. REV. STAT. § 469.590-601 (1981). Oregon is the only state to declare that
its statute was motivated solely by economic concerns. The Oregon statute, similar to the Califor-
nia, Connecticut and Maine statutes, conditions construction of nuclear plants upon federal
approval of a nuclear waste disposal technology. See also infra note 155.
155. See HAWAII CoNsT. art. XI, § 8; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-136 (West Supp.
1981-1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 3371-3376 (Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1.3-5
(1979). Connecticut and Maine condition construction of nuclear plants upon the availability
of federally approved nuclear waste disposal facilities. Hawaii and Rhode Island require the
approval of their state legislatures before construction of nuclear plants is permitted. None
of these states, however, has expressly stated a rationale or motivation for their laws.
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indicate more than one such purpose.'56 In those cases with no single apparent
purpose, further litigation will be necessary to delineate fully the limits of state
authority to control nuclear power plant construction.
Any further impact of Pacific Gas depends upon congressional reaction
to the Court's decision. If Congress concludes that Pacific Gas broadened
the scope of state power beyond that intended by the Atomic Energy Act,
Congress might enact legislation restricting state power to regulate nuclear
energy; as of yet, no such legislation has been introduced. Until Congress
takes such action, Pacific Gas establishes the authority of states to control
the construction of nuclear power plants for economic purposes.
CONCLUSION
In Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation and Development Commission, the Supreme Court clarified and ex-
panded the states' authority to regulate construction of nuclear power plants.
The Court extended the purview of state authority to include the ability to
prohibit construction of new nuclear plants when the prohibition is based
on economic considerations. The Court's analysis, however, did not provide
guidance for future decisions in which the rationale offered by a state to
support its challenged law is not accepted as readily as California's economic
rationale. Nevertheless, Pacific Gas unquestionably gives states expanded
authority to control the development of nuclear power within their borders.
John Fredrickson
156. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 164, app. § 3-3 (West Supp. 1983-1984). Massachusetts
requires the approval of both a majority of the voters voting in a public election and the
legislature before a nuclear plant can be built. The legislature must find that a nuclear plant
is the best means for meeting energy needs considering the factors of overall cost, reliability,
safety, environmental impact, and land use planning. Id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 75-20-1201 to -1205 (1983). Montana's statute declares that the state is concerned with pro-
viding jobs, minimizing energy costs, the radiological hazards of nuclear waste, and the possibility
of catastrophic accidents at nuclear plants. Id. § 75-20-1201. Construction is prohibited:
(1) unless there are no legal limits regarding the rights of persons to recover full compensation
in the event of liability; (2) until safety systems have been demonstrated to the satisfaction
of the state; and (3) until it has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the state that radioac-
tive materials from the plant can be effectively contained. Id. § 75-20-1203. Montana's statute
seems to be more obviously directed at safety concerns than any other existing state law con-
trolling the construction of nuclear plants. Vermont requires approval of the legislature before
a plant may be constructed and implies a variety of concerns including aesthetics, air and water
purity, the natural environment, and public health and safety. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6503 (Supp. 1983).

